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INTRODUCTION

Lawsuits filed by the cities of San Francisco and Oakland in
California state court allege that five of the world’s largest oil
companies actively campaigned to promote fossil fuel use even as
they knew that their products would contribute to dangerous
global warming and associated sea level rise. The suits, which
initially rested on state public nuisance law alone, seek abatement
orders requiring the defendants to fund adaptation measures
ranging from the construction of sea walls to the elevation of lowlying property and buildings. Other coastal jurisdictions in
California—and, separately, the State of Rhode Island, City of New
York, City of Baltimore, King County (Washington), three local
governments in Colorado, and an association of Pacific Coast
fishermen—have filed similar suits asserting public nuisance as
well as other tort, statutory, and public trust claims for sea level
rise and other climate impacts, seeking both abatement and
damages.
This Article explores the potential for state public nuisance
claims to facilitate adaptation, resource protection, and other
climate change responses by coastal communities in California.1
The California public nuisance actions represent just the latest
chapter in efforts to spur responses to climate change and attribute
responsibility for climate change through the common law. Part II
of this Article describes the California public nuisance lawsuits
and situates them in the context of common law actions directed
against climate change. Part III considers the preliminary
defenses that defendants have raised and could raise in the
California public nuisance lawsuits, including the existence of
state common law in this context, separation of powers and the
political question doctrine, displacement and preemption, and
standing. Part IV considers the potential merits of the plaintiffs’
public nuisance claims under California law.
A product manufacturer may be held liable for assisting in the
creation of a public nuisance under California law if the
manufacturer promoted a harmful product with knowledge of the

1. We do not address in detail other common law claims raised in the
California cases or any of the claims brought in other jurisdictions.
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hazards involved.2 Defendants are likely to dispute whether their
research and marketing efforts constituted promotion of a harmful
product and whether they knew of the link between their products
and the hazards of climate change. Outside of California, the law
of public nuisance also may allow defendants to assert that they
lacked control of the instrumentality of harm—i.e., fossil fuels—
once they were sold to consumers. Ultimately, even if plaintiffs are
successful in establishing the elements of public nuisance, courts
will have to grapple with fashioning a suitable remedy. Although
the primary relief sought, establishment of an abatement fund,
seems relatively straightforward, courts nevertheless may hesitate
to tackle a global problem that hardly resembles run-of-the-mill
public nuisances.3
Notwithstanding the obstacles that plaintiffs face in litigating
and proving public nuisance, fossil fuel companies face the
prospect of protracted litigation and a risk of substantial liability.
Beyond the immediate outcomes of specific cases, these suits could
spur direct federal action on the issue, encourage an industry shift
away from fossil fuels, and shape the narrative on the reality of—
and responsibility for—climate change.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The California Lawsuits
The San Francisco and Oakland climate change lawsuits
(collectively referred to as the “San Francisco Bay lawsuits”) are
largely identical. Both suits name as defendants the “five largest
investor-owned fossil fuel corporations in the world as measured
by their historic production of fossil fuels.”4 The complaints allege

2. County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 324–
25, 328 (Ct. App. 2006).
3. See, e.g., California v. BP, No. C 16-06011 WHA, No. C 17-06012 WHA,
2018 WL 1064293, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) (suggesting that “the scope of
the worldwide predicament [of climate change] demands the most comprehensive
view available” and that “[a] patchwork of fifty different answers to the same
fundamental global issue would be unworkable.”).
4. First Amended Complaint at 2, City of San Francisco v. BP, No. 3:17-cv06012-WHA (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter SF Am. Compl.] (naming BP,
Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil, and Royal Dutch Shell as defendants);
First Amended Complaint at 2, City of Oakland v. BP, No. 3:17-cv-06011-WHA
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that these defendants “did not simply produce fossil fuels” but also
engaged in sophisticated public relations “campaigns to promote
pervasive fossil fuel usage” and downplayed risks even as they
knew that their fossil fuels were contributing to global warming.5
As amended, the suits seek an abatement fund remedy pursuant
to California and federal public nuisance law and identify various
abatement projects that are already being planned or undertaken
in response to sea level rise.6 Notably, the plaintiff cities “do not
seek to impose liability” for damages, nor do they seek to restrain
the defendants’ business operations. 7 As the complaints state,
“[these] case[s are], fundamentally, about shifting the costs of
abating sea level rise harm . . . back onto the companies.”8
Of the recent climate change public nuisance litigation, the
San Francisco Bay lawsuits have progressed relatively rapidly.
Defendants removed the cases to federal district court, which
denied the plaintiffs’ motions to remand the cases to state court
and held that the plaintiffs’ nuisance claims “are necessarily
governed by federal common law” (hereinafter “San Francisco Bay
removal order”).9 The district court subsequently dismissed the
suits, holding that the Clean Air Act displaced the claims to the
extent that they were based on domestic greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions and that any foreign GHG emissions linked to the
defendants must be addressed by Congress or the executive branch
rather than the courts (hereinafter “San Francisco Bay dismissal

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Oakland Am. Compl.] (naming BP, Chevron,
ConocoPhillips, Exxon Mobil, and Royal Dutch Shell as defendants).
5. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 3; Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 4, at
2–3.
6. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 1, 5, 58–61; Oakland Am. Compl., supra
note 4, at 5, 49–55.
7. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 5; Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 4, at
5.
8. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 5; Oakland Am. Compl., supra note 4, at
5.
9. California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2.
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order”).10 The plaintiffs have appealed the district court’s rulings
to the Ninth Circuit.11
The other California climate change lawsuits, filed
individually by Marin County,12 San Mateo County,13 the City of
Imperial Beach, 14 Santa Cruz County, 15 the City of Santa Cruz,16
and the City of Richmond,17 and the Pacific Coast Federation of
Fishermen’s Associations,18 are substantially broader than the
San Francisco Bay lawsuits in several ways. First, these other
suits allege a range of tort claims in addition to public nuisance,
including: negligence, strict liability, trespass, failure to warn, and
design defect.19 Second, these suits name as defendants not only
the five oil companies named in the San Francisco Bay lawsuits,
but also various other companies engaged in the production and
sale of coal, oil, and natural gas. 20 Third, while these suits
10. City of Oakland v. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024–26 (N.D. Cal. 2018),
appeal filed, Case No. 18-16663; see also City of New York v. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d
466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal filed, Case No. 18-2188 (finding New York City could
not pursue nuisance and trespass claims against oil and gas companies for
injuries arising from greenhouse gases).
11. See Notice of Appeal, City of Oakland v. BP, No. 18-16663 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
24, 2018).
12. Complaint, County of Marin v. Chevron, No. CV 1702586 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jul. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Marin Compl.].
13. Complaint, County of San Mateo v. Chevron, No. 17CIV03222 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017) [hereinafter San Mateo Compl.].
14. Complaint, Imperial Beach v. Chevron, No. C17-01227 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jul. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Imperial Beach Compl.].
15. Complaint, City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron, No. 17CV03243 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Dec. 20, 2017) [hereinafter City of Santa Cruz Compl.].
16. Complaint, County of Santa Cruz v. Chevron, No. 17CV03242 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2017) [hereinafter County of Santa Cruz Compl.].
17. Complaint, City of Richmond v. Chevron, No. C18-00055 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Jan. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Richmond Compl.].
18. Complaint, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Inc. v.
Chevron Corp., No. C18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018) [hereinafter
Pacific Coast Compl.].
19. Marin Compl., supra note 12, at 79–98; San Mateo Compl., supra note
13, at 78–97; Imperial Beach Compl., supra note 14, at 75–94; City of Santa Cruz
Compl., supra note 15, at 95–118; County of Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 16,
at 99–122; Richmond Compl., supra note 17, at 90–112; Pacific Coast Compl.,
supra note 18, at 76–90.
20. Marin Compl., supra note 12, at 7–22; San Mateo Compl., supra note 13,
at 6–22; Imperial Beach Compl., supra note 14, at 6–22; City of Santa Cruz
Compl., supra note 15, at 6–20; County of Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 16, at
7–21; Richmond Compl., supra note 17, at 6–20; Pacific Coast Compl., supra note
18, at 7–25. All together, these defendants are alleged to be directly responsible
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resemble the San Francisco Bay lawsuits in seeking “to ensure that
the parties responsible for sea level rise bear the costs of its
impacts”21 on the plaintiffs, some of them also seek to internalize
the costs associated with other impacts from climate change,
including drought and wildfire.22 Finally, these suits request—in
addition to abatement—disgorgement of profits, compensatory
damages, and punitive damages.23
Like the San Francisco Bay lawsuits, the other California local
government cases were removed to federal court. However, those
other cases were assigned to a different federal judge, who
remanded the San Mateo, Marin, and Imperial Beach cases to state
court after determining that the claims should be governed by state
common law rather than federal common law (hereinafter the “San
Mateo remand order”).24 At the time of this writing, the San Mateo
remand order was on appeal before the Ninth Circuit, and the
remand order was stayed pending resolution of the appeal; motions
to remand the Santa Cruz and Richmond cases (hereinafter “Santa
Cruz cases”), which were filed later, were also granted but stayed
pending the appeal of the San Mateo remand order,25 and then
consolidated with the San Mateo appeal. 26
B. Common Law Litigation on Climate Change
The recent spate of climate cases are only the latest common
law battles over climate change. Frustrated by the slow pace of
legislative and regulatory responses, particularly at the federal
level, and having suffered the adverse impacts of climate-related
for 20% of CO2 emissions worldwide between 1965 and 2015. Marin Compl., supra
note 12, at 3.
21. Marin Compl., supra note 12, at 4; San Mateo Compl., supra note 13, at
4; see Imperial Beach Compl., supra note 14, at 4.
22. See, e.g., City of Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 15, at 34–40; County of
Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 16, 34–35, 39–40.
23. Marin Compl., supra note 12, at 99; San Mateo Compl., supra note 13, at
98; Imperial Beach Compl., supra note 14, at 95; City of Santa Cruz Compl., supra
note 15, at 119; County of Santa Cruz Compl., supra note 16, at 123; Richmond
Compl., supra note 17, at 112; Pacific Coast Compl., supra note 18, at 90.
24. County of San Mateo v. Chevron, 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal.
2018), appeal filed Case No. 18-15503.
25. County of Santa Cruz v. Chevron, 3:18-cv-00450-VC, 3:18-cv-00458-VC,
3:18-cv-00732-VC (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2018).
26. See Order Consolidating Appeals, County of Santa Cruz v. Chevron, No.
18-16376 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018).
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slow-onset changes and extreme events, past plaintiffs have filed a
number of suits invoking common law doctrines. 27 These suits
have named fossil fuel companies, power companies, and
automobile manufacturers as defendants, and they have sought to
assign responsibility to these actors for their roles in emitting
GHGs, promoting uses of their products that emit GHGs, and
concealing the serious threats posed by climate change.28
The tort theories expressed in these earlier lawsuits are
similar to those we are seeing now: trespass, negligence, strict
liability (for design defect and failure to warn), private nuisance,
public nuisance, and civil conspiracy.29
From the outset,
commentators have observed that attempts to apply such theories
to the complex and “super wicked problem” of climate change are
likely to encounter difficulties with respect to basic elements of
traditional tort analysis—especially duty, breach, and causation. 30
27. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); Native Vill.
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049, 1054 (5th Cir. 2010), petition for writ of mandamus
denied sub nom. In re Comer, 562 U.S. 1133 (2011) (Comer I); Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (S.D. Miss. 2012), aff’d, 718 F.3d 460
(Comer II); California v. General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
17, 2007).
28. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 418 (naming as defendants the
Tennessee Valley Authority and four private companies that operate fossil-fuel
fired power plants); Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 853 n.1 (naming as defendants multiple
oil companies and power companies); Comer, 585 F.3d at 859 (naming as
defendants companies engaged in energy, fossil fuels, and chemical industries);
General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *1 (noting that six defendant
automakers produce vheicles that emit over 20% of anthropogenic carbon dioxide
emissions in U.S.).
29. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 429 (asserting federal and state
public nuisance claims); Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 853 (asserting federal public
nuisance claim); General Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *2 (asserting federal
and state public nuisance claims); Comer, 585 F.3d at 859–60 (alleging state law
claims of public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, unjust enrichment,
fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy).
30. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1158–60
(2009) (discussing characterization of climate change as a “super wicked
problem”). See Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit
Might Look Like, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 135, 136 (2011) (noting common law
climate change cases “pose unique difficulties because current atmospheric levels
of GHGs result from the cumulative emissions of millions or billions of emitters”
and “no specific injury can be attributed to any specific polluter”); Douglas A.
Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2011)
(“[C]ourts in all likelihood will agree with commentators that nuisance and other
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With respect to the element of duty, it is not obvious what the duty
of ordinary care requires in the context of climate change. 31
Moreover, demonstrating breach of the duty of care generally
requires a showing that the harms from defendants’ activities
outweighed the benefits.32 Such a showing can be difficult to make
in light of the social value and ubiquity of GHG-generating
activities. Finally, the causation analysis is complicated by the
multiplicity of GHG sources and the difficulty of attributing
specific events to specific sources or, in some instances and to
varying degrees, to climate change more generally.33
Of the available tort theories, public nuisance has been
regarded by some as the most promising for climate change
plaintiffs because it focuses on harms to the general public rather
than harms to individual landowners or victims.34 Characterizing
climate change as a public nuisance fits within a long history of
addressing pollution problems as public nuisances, albeit on a
different scale.35 Public nuisance doctrine requires proof of an
unreasonable and substantial interference with a public right.36 As
such, it arguably offers the advantage of allowing plaintiffs to
direct courts’ attention to the severity of the harms suffered rather
than on the balancing of those harms against the social benefit of
defendants’ conduct.37
Climate change litigation has invoked not only tort claims, but
also the public trust doctrine. In a series of public trust cases
brought in state and federal courts around the country, youth
plaintiffs suing federal and state governments have contended that
the defendants have abdicated their trust duty to protect the
traditional tort theories are overwhelmed by the magnitude and the complexity
of the climate change conundrum.”).
31. Kysar, supra note 30, at 10–20.
32. Id. at 28.
33. Id. at 29–42.
34. Id. at 24.
35. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); see
generally Tracy D. Hester, A New Front Blowing In: State Law and the Future of
Climate Change Public Nuisance Litigation, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 49, 56 (2012)
(discussing various uses of public nuisance to address environmental threats).
36. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 821B(1), 821B(1)(a) (Am. Law Inst.
1979); Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 1334 (2000) (defining public nuisance as
“a substantial and unreasonable interference with a right held in common by the
general public, in use of public facilities, in health, safety, and convenience”).
37. Kysar, supra note 30, at 25.
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atmosphere and other natural resources. 38 Alleging a trust duty
based on the common law or on constitutional provisions, these
plaintiffs have generally sought to compel more stringent
government regulation of GHG emissions, as well as more
protective management of public lands. 39
Thus far, courts have viewed common law tort and public trust
claims in climate change cases with a mix of annoyance,
skepticism, curiosity, and inspiration. Some trial courts have held
that threshold issues preclude consideration of the claims, finding
that plaintiffs lack standing or that their cases pose nonjusticiable
political questions.40 Two U.S. Court of Appeals panels,
meanwhile, have held that there is no threshold bar to such
claims.41 Where cases have survived threshold challenges they
have generally foundered on other grounds.42

38. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 12 (D.D.C. 2012) (alleging
violation of federal public trust); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224,
1263 (D. Or. 2016) (alleging violation of federal public trust and substantive due
process); Sanders-Reed v. Martinez, 350 P.3d 1221, 1222–23 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015)
(alleging violation of state public trust duty to protect atmosphere); Kanuk v.
State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1090–91 (Alaska 2014) (alleging
breach of state’s public trust obligations under state constitution).
39. See, e.g., Alec L., 863 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (seeking injunction directing “six
federal agencies to take all necessary actions to enable carbon dioxide emissions
to peak by December 2012 and decline by at least six percent per year beginning
in 2013”); Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1234 (challenging “decisions defendants
have made across a vast set of topics—decisions like whether and to what extent
to regulate CO2 emissions from power plants and vehicles, whether to permit
fossil fuel extraction and development to take place on federal lands, how much
to charge for use of those lands, . . .”).
40. See, e.g., Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024–26 (dismissing federal
common law nuisance claims on displacement and separation of powers grounds);
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 876–83 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (dismissing federal common law nuisance claims on grounds that
plaintiffs lacked standing and that their tort claims were nonjusticiable to the
political question doctrine), aff’d on alternative grounds, 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th
Cir. 2012); Sanders-Reed, 350 P.3d at 1225–27 (holding state public trust claim
displaced by state statute); Kanuk, 335 P.3d at 1096–1103 (affirming dismissal of
state public trust claims either for lack of justiciability or on prudential grounds).
See also Alec L. v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x. 7, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (affirming
dismissal of climate change suit based on federal public trust doctrine on grounds
that public trust doctrine is a matter of state law).
41. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 860; Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d
309, 392 (2d Cir. 2009).
42. See infra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing Comer); see also
infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text (discussing Am. Elec. Power Co.).
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The Supreme Court directly addressed the availability of
federal public nuisance as a means to address greenhouse gas
emissions in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (“AEP”).43
Led by Connecticut and several other states, the plaintiffs in AEP
asserted public nuisance claims and sought injunctive relief
against electric power companies collectively responsible for onetenth of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. 44 The Court held such
claims to be unavailable under federal law, explaining that “the
Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any
federal common-law right to seek abatement” of carbon
emissions.45 Displacement resulted from Congress’ delegation of
authority to regulate carbon emissions, regardless of whether EPA
had actually exercised that authority.46
Following the AEP decision, a plausible case still could have
been made for the viability of federal public nuisance actions for
damages, an issue not raised in the AEP litigation. However, the
Ninth Circuit rejected this possibility in Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp.47 While acknowledging that “the lack of a federal remedy
may be a factor to be considered in determining whether Congress
has displaced federal common law,” the Ninth Circuit, applying
Supreme Court precedents on displacement, held “if a cause of
action is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.” 48
Although AEP and Kivalina yielded unfavorable outcomes for
plaintiffs seeking to redress climate change through federal public
nuisance, their holdings were fairly narrow. Claims based on
doctrines other than federal public nuisance remain potentially
viable and continue to be litigated. 49 Moreover, as described
further in Part III, neither AEP nor Kivalina foreclosed the
possibility that a public nuisance claim based on state law might
be viable. In AEP, the Supreme Court expressly left the matter
open for consideration in further litigation.50 And in Kivalina, the
43. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 410.
44. Id. at 418.
45. Id. at 424.
46. Id. at 426.
47. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1262–63 (denying motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claim that government’s fossil fuel policies violate federal public trust
doctrine and the U.S. Constitution).
50. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 429.
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concurrence noted that “[d]isplacement of the federal common law
does not leave those injured by air pollution without a remedy,”
and suggested state nuisance law as “an available option to the
extent it is not preempted by federal law.” 51
The availability of state common law claims was separately
taken up in Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, where plaintiff property
owners alleged that certain power, fossil fuel, and chemical
companies’ GHG emissions contributed to climate change and
exacerbated the harmful effects of Hurricane Katrina, constituting
a private nuisance as well as a public nuisance, trespass,
negligence, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
civil conspiracy.52 The case involved a convoluted procedural
history, featuring a dismissal in district court, a reversal at the
Fifth Circuit, an en banc decision to vacate the reversal due to
failure to muster a quorum, the plaintiffs’ filing a writ of
mandamus asking the Supreme Court to reinstate the panel
decision, the denial of the writ, 53 the plaintiffs’ re-filing their case
in district court, and dismissal based on res judicata grounds—
though not, ultimately, on the merits. 54 Notably, the Fifth Circuit
held in the first go-around that a diversity suit brought under state
common law for damages was materially distinguishable from
public nuisance claims brought under federal common law and
seeking an injunction.55 The panel did not address the merits of
the public or private nuisance claims, leaving that for a prospective
trial56 but, given the rigmarole just described, a trial never
occurred.
So, despite over a decade of litigation, courts have yet to
definitively decide the substantive question of whether state public
nuisance claims may be premised on direct or indirect GHG
emissions. After both the Supreme Court ruling in AEP and the
Ninth Circuit ruling in Kivalina, the plaintiffs declined to pursue
any remaining claims in state court, 57 and the Comer precedent is
51. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 866 (Pro, J., concurring).
52. Comer II, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 852–53.
53. Comer I, 562 U.S. at 1133.
54. Comer II, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 855–57.
55. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 878–79.
56. Id. at 880.
57. Adam Wernick, Will These Alaska Villagers Be America’s First Climate
Change Refugees?, PUBLIC RADIO INT’L (Aug. 9, 2015), https://perma.cc/W7UJGMHH.
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inconclusive. The current wave of California public nuisance
lawsuits could open a significant new chapter in climate change
litigation by forcing courts to address the merits of state public
nuisance law–or they may never get there.
III.

PRELIMINARY DEFENSES

At the time of this writing, defendants had successfully
removed the San Francisco Bay lawsuits to federal court and
prevailed on a motion to dismiss after convincing the district court
to analyze the claims under federal common law rather than state
law.58 Meanwhile, plaintiffs had successfully moved to remand the
San Mateo, Marin, Imperial Beach, Santa Cruz, and Richmond
cases to state court, persuading another judge in the same district
court that state common law should govern the cases. 59 The result
is that there are conflicting opinions within the Northern District
of California on whether federal or state law applies. This Part
describes and assesses the merits of some of the most visible
preliminary defenses, including those already raised in support of
removal and dismissal.
A. Existence of a State-Based Common Law Claim for
Nuisance
Perhaps the most important threshold question confronting all
of the California cases is whether state public nuisance and other
common law claims for abatement and/or damages resulting from
climate change are available. In the San Francisco Bay lawsuits,
defendants successfully argued that the local governments’ claims,
though styled as state common law claims, are necessarily federal
common law claims.60 Originally, defendants offered two slightly
different arguments. First, they argued that courts have
recognized a federal common law public nuisance claim for climate
change and, therefore, there can be no state common law public
nuisance claim.61 Second, they argued that the cases involve
58. California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2.
59. County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937; see also Order Granting
Motions to Remand, County of Santa Cruz, No. 3:18-cv-00732-VC (July 10, 2018).
60. California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2.
61. Notice of Removal at 19, California v. BP, No. 3:17-cv-06012-EMC (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 20, 2017) [hereinafter BP Notice of Removal].
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“uniquely federal interests” requiring the application of federal
common law.62 The district court ruled in their favor, finding that:
Plaintiffs’ claims for public nuisance, though pled as state-law
claims, depend on a global complex of geophysical cause and
effect involving all nations of the planet (and the oceans and
atmosphere). It necessarily involves the relationships between
the United States and all other nations. It demands to be
governed by as universal a rule of apportioning responsibility as
is available . . . [P]laintiffs’ claims, if any, are governed by federal
common law.63

While the question emerged in the removal context, the
answer is important beyond the outcome of that particular battle.
If all climate change public nuisance cases are federal, then it is
possible that all of them could be dismissed out of hand, due to the
Supreme Court’s holding in AEP that the Clean Air Act displaced
federal common law suits against GHG emitters.64 Indeed, this is
one of the key elements of the San Francisco Bay dismissal order.65
But, the implications go even further. At the core of the argument
against the existence of state public nuisance claims is the notion
that common law has no proper role to play when it comes to
climate change—whether it be in addressing the sources of GHG
emissions or the adverse impacts that result from them—because
all of it is wrapped up in federal policies pertaining to energy,
economy, security, and appropriate levels of air pollution control,
a complex web of national and foreign affairs concerns governed by
congressional statutes and executive branch authority. Though
clever in its confusions, our analysis concludes that the argument
against the existence of state common law should not, in the end,
prevail.
1. The Argument from Precedent
One argument defendants marshaled in support of limiting
common law climate change litigation to federal common law went,
in essence, like this: (1) Courts in AEP and Kivalina have
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 3.
California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *5.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424.
Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024–26.
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recognized the existence of a federal common law cause of action
for public nuisance;66 (2) These and other judicial opinions have
made statements to the effect that there cannot be a federal
common law cause of action and a state common law cause of action
that apply to the same matter;67 (3) Therefore, there is only a
federal common law cause of action for the nuisance of climate
change.68
However, as the district court found in the San Mateo remand
order, precedent runs directly counter to the conclusion that only
federal law can apply to climate change public nuisance claims. 69
Indeed, prior to the San Francisco Bay removal order, every court
that looked at the question of the viability of state-based nuisance
and tort claims for climate change came to the opposite
conclusion.70 The Supreme Court’s view is that the existence of a
federal common law claim that has been displaced by federal
legislation does not erase the possibility of state common law
claims; rather, it converts the availability of state claims into a
question of statutory preemption.71 Thus, in her opinion for a
unanimous court in AEP, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that,
in addition to their federal common law public nuisance claims,
plaintiffs had also pled state common law claims for nuisance
under the laws of various states in which emitting sources were
located.72 Regarding the viability of those claims, Justice Ginsburg
wrote:
In light of our holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal
common law, the availability vel non of a state lawsuit depends,
inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the federal Act . . . None of
the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the

66. BP Notice of Removal, supra note 61, at 5–11.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 4, 7–10.
69. County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937–38.
70. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
71. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327–29 (1981) (noting the
Clean Water Act preserved state common law cause of action in an area previously
governed by federal common law).
72. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 429.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2

14

2018]

Public Nuisance Claims & Climate Change

63

availability of a claim under state nuisance law. We therefore
leave the matter open for consideration on remand.73

In regards to the supplemental state law claims filed in
Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit panel noted simply that the district
court had declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and
dismissed the claim without prejudice to re-file in state court.74
Below, the district court had explained its decision by stating that
a federal court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.”75 In at least one judge’s view, then, a federal district
court does not have original jurisdiction over a case claiming a
state common law nuisance for climate change-related harm.
This view is consistent with the Fifth Circuit panel’s 2009
opinion in Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I)76 and the District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi’s decision three years later
in the next Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer II),77 the only other
decisions to address the question of jurisdiction in this context. In
Comer I, plaintiffs seeking damages for injuries suffered as a result
of Hurricane Katrina had invoked federal jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship.78 The Fifth Circuit panel concurred,
reasoning that it had original jurisdiction over a class action worth
more than $5 million where diversity of the parties is present.79
That the Fifth Circuit later vacated the decision is of no moment,
as the decision to do so was based on its failure to convene a
quorum for an en banc rehearing.80 This had the effect of
reinstating the district court’s dismissal of the case on political
question and standing grounds.81 The district court dismissed the
largely identical complaint filed in Comer II on several grounds:
73. Id. The district court in the San Francisco Bay lawsuits, while denying
the motion to remand, quoted Justice Ginsburg’s opinion on this point in
acknowledging that “AEP did not reach the plaintiffs’ state law claims.”
California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2 (quoting Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at
429).
74. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 854–55.
75. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882.
76. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 878–79.
77. Comer II, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 865.
78. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 859–61.
79. Id. at 860 n.1.
80. Comer I, 607 F.3d at 1055.
81. Id.
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res judicata, political question, standing, and preemption.82 The
Fifth Circuit upheld dismissal based on res judicata.83 None of the
foregoing supports the idea that state law claims do not exist.
Instead, the Comer cases appear to validate the existence of the
claims, even while doing away with them before reaching the
merits.
In short, we agree with the holding of the San Mateo remand
order that precedent plainly clears the pathway for state common
law claims, even if they may eventually be dismissed on
preemption or other grounds.84
2. The Argument from Federal Interests
Defendants’ argument that there are “uniquely federal
interests” at issue in the latest climate change cases derives from
the authority the Supreme Court has declared for courts to create
and apply federal common law where a lawsuit implicates
“uniquely federal interests.”85 The Supreme Court has described
these cases as those “narrow areas [that are] . . . concerned with
the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States
or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.” 86 In
seeking to convert the plaintiff governments’ claims into federal
common law claims, defendants posited that climate change is both
an issue concerning the rights and obligations of the United States
and a matter implicating foreign relations.87
The first argument re-styles the political question doctrine as
a constraint on state law rather than federal courts and, if
endorsed by the courts, could empower federal common law to hold
domain over a broad swath of policy areas that touch on energy,
environment, and natural resources. The political question
doctrine limits federal courts’ jurisdiction by delineating certain
cases as nonjusticiable, based on a number of factors.88 The
82. Comer II, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 855–66.
83. Comer II, 718 F.3d at 466–69.
84. County of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
85. E.g., Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
86. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
(citations omitted).
87. See BP Notice of Removal, supra note 61, at 9–11.
88. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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“uniquely federal interests” doctrine, by contrast, vests federal
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over certain cases involving “the
rights and obligations of the United States.” 89 The category of cases
where courts have found “the rights and obligations of the United
States” to be sufficiently at stake to warrant the exclusive
application of federal common law is highly circumscribed. It
applies only when the United States is a party to an action, such
as a contract dispute where the United States is a party to the
contract.90 Although the defendants in the California cases were in
some instances operating pursuant to federal licenses and permits,
and their production and sale of fossil fuels were arguably
consistent with domestic energy policy preferences, the United
States was and is not a party to the defendants’ actions.
The argument that climate change involves “disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with
foreign nations” sufficient to require a uniform federal rule was
found persuasive by the district court in the San Francisco Bay
lawsuits.91 In its removal order, the district court declared
“[t]aking the complaints at face value, the scope of the worldwide
predicament demands the most comprehensive view available,
which in our American court system means our federal courts and
our federal common law. A patchwork of fifty different answers to
the same fundamental global issue would be unworkable.” 92 Even
more directly, the district court stated “the transboundary problem
of global warming raises exactly the sort of federal interests that
necessitate a uniform solution.”93
This line of reasoning recalls the argument offered by EPA in
2003, when it denied a petition to regulate GHGs from motor
vehicles because, among other things, doing so “might impair the
President’s ability to negotiate with ‘key developing nations’ to
reduce emissions.”94 The Supreme Court rejected the idea that
vague allusions to foreign affairs could justify EPA’s decision not

89. Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641.
90. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 519; Diane P. Wood, Back to the Basics of Erie, 18
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 673, 687–89 (2014).
91. California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2–3 (quoting Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at
641).
92. Id. at *3.
93. Id.
94. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007).
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to exercise its statutory authority then,95 and courts should reject
the argument that similar allusions could foreclose the availability
of state common law claims now. This prong of the “uniquely
federal interests” analysis has, like the “rights and obligations of
the United States” prong, been applied in a far narrower set of
cases. In particular, courts have determined that cases involving
questions of international law, the Act of State doctrine, or
competing interests of states in their sovereign capacity may
require federal common law.96
None of these apply here. First, it is implausible that courts in
the United States will treat climate change as a matter bound by
and confined to international law. Although climate change is the
subject of international agreements, those agreements do not
preclude subnational efforts to address the problem (in fact, such
efforts are encouraged), nor do they purport to address the liability
of nonstate actors. Second, the Act of State doctrine—which
concerns acts done by a foreign government within its own
territory—is irrelevant to these nuisance cases against fossil fuel
companies.97 Third, the states are already undertaking extensive
efforts to address climate change, both independently and in small
groups.98 The present cases simply do not involve a conflict
between states in their sovereign capacity, such as interstate
disputes over boundaries or water apportionment. 99
In our view, it is not the case that there is only one kind of
public nuisance action that applies to climate change and its
related harms, and that the action is a federal one. The case law
addressing the issue is overwhelmingly to the contrary, and the
expansion of the “uniquely federal interests” test to cover climate
change is untenable. If the state common law claims are to fail, it
should be on a basis other than that they simply do not exist.

95. Id. at 533–34.
96. Wood, supra note 90, at 692–95.
97. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) (“The act
of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country
from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory.”).
98. See U.S. State Climate Action Plans, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY
SOLUTIONS, https://perma.cc/46DW-KR6C.
99. See Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law,
100 NW. U.L. REV. 585, 596–99 (2006).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2

18

2018]

Public Nuisance Claims & Climate Change

67

B. Separation of Powers and the Political Question
Doctrine
The separation of powers issues implicated by the California
public nuisance cases have emerged in a number of different, often
blended forms, which evoke the political question doctrine, foreign
policy preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause, and other
concepts. For the purpose of analytic simplicity, here we address
arguments against justiciability based on the political question
doctrine, which encompasses many, if not necessarily all, of the
related concepts.
In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court enumerated six factors
or “formulations” that may indicate to federal courts the existence
of a non-justiciable political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found [(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
[(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or [(5)] an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question. 100

In AEP, the federal district court originally found that the case
raised a political question necessarily left for the political branches
because it required an initial policy determination of a nonjudicial
kind.101 The Second Circuit reversed this judgment, finding that
courts have long adjudicated complex environmental nuisance
cases, and that the political question doctrine did not pose a bar.102
The Supreme Court’s view of the matter is somewhat obscure.
Justice Ginsburg noted in her opinion that “[f]our members of the
Court” found that neither standing nor any “other threshold

100. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
101. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 419.
102. Id.
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obstacle bars review.” 103 A footnote in the opinion refers to the
political question doctrine,104 but neither the footnote nor the text
offers an explanation of exactly how the justices voted on the
matter. All of which leaves the political question issue, as it applies
to a federal common law claim seeking an injunction against GHG
emissions, unresolved at the highest level.
The facts of the California cases, however, are different.
Plaintiffs have framed their cases not in relation to climate change
mitigation policy but rather in relation to these private actors’
individual and collective conduct, which includes not only
producing GHG emissions, but also interacting with the market
and with regulators in a sustained disinformation campaign.105
Plaintiffs are not seeking to establish a specific policy in regards to
GHG emissions, public lands management, or other matters of
federal agency discretion. Rather, they are seeking abatement and
damages for harms caused by market behavior they claim was,
among other things, knowing, negligent, and intentionally
misleading.106 Thus, the analysis in federal court should, in theory,
differ.
If the cases are remanded to state court, or if state law is
applied in federal court, the political question doctrine would
appear inapplicable. Under California law, the political question
doctrine “compels dismissal of a lawsuit when complete deference
to the role of the legislative or executive branch is required and
there is nothing upon which a court can adjudicate without
impermissibly intruding upon the authority of another branch of
government.”107 These conditions do not apply to the plaintiffs’
claims, which are based on the common law and do not threaten to
intrude on the authority of the legislature or the executive branch.
Likewise, in Comer I, the Fifth Circuit panel conducted an
extensive analysis and held that the political question doctrine did
not bar state nuisance claims. 108 The political question doctrine

103. Id. at 420.
104. Id. at 420 n.6.
105. See, e.g., SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 41–49.
106. See supra notes 21 – 23 and accompanying text.
107. Schabarum v. California Legislature, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 750 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998).
108. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 875–76.
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does not appear to be intended to apply to actions invoking state
common law claims.
C. Federal Displacement and Statutory Preemption
In AEP, the Supreme Court found that a public nuisance case
brought in federal court under federal common law had been
displaced by the Clean Air Act.109 Because the Court had
previously held in Massachusetts v. EPA that EPA was authorized
to regulate GHGs by federal legislation,110 there was no longer
room for federal common law. In the San Francisco Bay dismissal
order, the district court found that this precedent controlled to the
extent the federal nuisance claims involved defendants’ domestic
activities.111 If state nuisance cases are converted into federal
ones, one might expect this result to repeat. By contrast, in the San
Mateo remand order, the district court noted that in AEP “the
Supreme Court noted that the question of whether such state law
claims survived would depend on whether they are preempted by
the federal statute that had displaced federal common law (a
question the Court did not resolve),” and that “[t]his seems to
reflect the Court’s view that once federal common law is displaced
by a federal statute, there is no longer a possibility that state law
claims could be superseded by the previously-operative federal
common law.”112
It remains an open question whether state claims, such as
those pled in the California cases, are preempted by federal
legislation including the Clean Air Act, the Mineral Leasing Act,
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and other statutes setting
federal policies for GHG emissions and fossil fuel extraction,
transportation, and consumption. 113 Notably, in the San Mateo
remand order, the district court found that the claims were not
removable on the basis of “complete preemption,” as defendants did
not point to any statutory provision that would implicate such

109. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424.
110. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.
111. Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024.
112. San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
113. In Comer I, a Fifth Circuit panel concluded that federal preemption was
inapplicable to plaintiffs’ state common law claims because there was no federal
legislation barring state suits. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 879–80.
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preemption.114 The court also noted that “[t]here may be important
questions of ordinary preemption, but those are for the state courts
to decide upon remand.”115
Courts’ analyses of ordinary preemption of state common law,
should they reach the issue, may rest on North Carolina v.
Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), in which the Fourth Circuit
dismissed a common law nuisance action brought by the state of
North Carolina against TVA. 116 The lawsuit focused on emissions
from TVA-operated power plants in Alabama and Tennessee,
which were alleged to cause air pollution and associated health
problems in North Carolina. 117 The Fourth Circuit held that North
Carolina plaintiffs could not seek redress under North Carolina
law for defendants’ out-of-state activities and that, even if the
plaintiffs had brought public nuisance claims under Alabama or
Tennessee law, those claims would have failed because the
defendants’ facilities held valid permits to emit pollutants.118 The
court reasoned that the defendants could not be held liable under
state public nuisance for the same interstate polluting activities
covered by the permits, noting that “[c]ourts traditionally have
been reluctant to enjoin as a public nuisance activities which have
been considered and specifically authorized by the government.”119
The Third and Sixth Circuits reached the opposite conclusion.
In Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, the Third Circuit held that
Pennsylvania plaintiffs could seek damages under Pennsylvania
law for “ash and contaminants settling on their property,” even
though those pollutants had come from facilities permitted to emit
under the Clean Air Act.120 In Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply,
Inc., a case dealing with fungus growing on plaintiffs’ property as

114. San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937–38.
115. Id. at 938.
116. North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 312 (4th Cir. 2010).
117. Id. at 296.
118. Id. at 308–09.
119. Id. at 309 (quoting New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30,
33 (2d Cir. 1981)). The court held that the emissions from the Tennessee Valley
Authority’s 11 coal-fired power plants “cannot logically be public nuisances under
Alabama and Tennessee law where TVA is in compliance with EPA NAAQS, the
corresponding state SIPs, and the permits that implement them.” Id. at 310.
120. Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 189, 197 (3d Cir.
2013) (“[T]he suit here, brought by Pennsylvania residents under Pennsylvania
law against a source of pollution located in Pennsylvania, is not preempted.”).
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a result of emissions from defendant’s whiskey distillery,121 and in
Little v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.,122 a case closely resembling Bell
v. Cheswick, the Sixth Circuit found that courts “distinguish[]
between claims based on the common law of the source state—
which are not preempted by the Clean Air Act—and claims based
on the common law of a non-source state—which are preempted by
the Clean Air Act.”123
Even if the reasoning of North Carolina v. TVA were correct,
there is at least one key distinction between it and the California
cases: the facilities in TVA were specifically permitted to pollute
under the standards set through the Clean Air Act, and the
permits in question authorized the pollution in question. Here, by
contrast, few of the federal programs through which defendants
have operated, and few of the foreign governments that have
permitted them to operate in other jurisdictions, have, until recent
years, considered or disclosed, far less sought to regulate, the
downstream GHG emissions associated with their activities.124
Although defendants have already raised preemption-like issues
on other, non-Clean Air Act grounds, the preemptive effect of those
statutes remains to be seen.
D. Standing
Standing is a question that comes up in most climate change
lawsuits, and it is a threshold issue in any challenge to government
action, or inaction, in the climate change arena. But, the California
cases involve common law tort claims. The elements of standing–
injury, causation, redressability–constitute the merits of the
case.125 Were plaintiffs harmed in a tortious manner? Did
defendants cause that harm? Are plaintiffs entitled to abatement?
121. Merrick v. Diageo Am. Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“The states’ rights savings clause of the Clean Air Act expressly preserves the
state common law standards on which plaintiffs sue.”).
122. Little v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 805 F.3d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 2015).
123. Merrick, 805 F.3d at 693.
124. See Michael Burger and Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream
Emissions Analysis: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
109 (2017).
125. See Luke Meier, Using Tort Law to Understand the Causation Prong of
Standing, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1241, 1248—49 (2011) (noting that the standing
analysis involves many assumptions and speculation, fact-intensive inquiry,
competing experts, and weighing of evidence).
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Those questions constitute the whole case, not a preliminary
matter to determine justiciability. In such circumstances where
the standing and merits inquiries overlap, a plaintiff need not
prove its case in order to avoid dismissal on standing grounds;
rather, a case should be dismissed only if “entirely frivolous” or
having “no foundation in law.” 126
Standing was an issue in AEP. In her opinion, Justice
Ginsburg noted that “[f]our members of the Court would hold that
at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing.”127 Justice Sonia
Sotomayor did not participate in that decision, meaning, it is safe
to assume, that Justice Anthony Kennedy voted to uphold his own
opinion from Massachusetts v. EPA, which found that
Massachusetts had standing to sue due to harm suffered from sea
level rise associated with global warming. 128 (That opinion,
importantly, relied on the “special solicitude” owed states due to
their quasi-sovereign status.129). Given Justice Kennedy’s
retirement, it is unknown whether there will be five votes for the
broad proposition that states have standing to sue for climate
change, in either a regulatory or common law context, or whether
the Court will reverse that core holding from Massachusetts.
The Fifth Circuit squarely addressed the issue of whether nonstate plaintiffs had Article III standing to bring a state public
nuisance claim in Comer I. The court noted that there was no
question that the plaintiffs satisfied the injury-in-fact and
redressability requirements, as they alleged specific harm and
sought damages to compensate for the harm. 130 The court held that
it was not appropriate to rule on causation at the motion to dismiss
stage, because it “essentially calls upon us to evaluate the merits
of plaintiffs’ causes of action, [and] is misplaced at this threshold
standing stage of the litigation.” 131
The Fifth Circuit also found that the plaintiffs in Comer I
“easily satisf[ied] Mississippi’s ‘liberal standing requirements.’” 132
126. Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
141 F.3d 364, 367–68 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
127. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 420.
128. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–27.
129. Id. at 520.
130. Comer I, 585 F.3d at 863–64.
131. Id. at 864.
132. Id. at 862 (quoting Van Slyke v. Bd. Tr’s of State Inst. of Higher
Learning, 613 So.2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1993)).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2

24

2018]

Public Nuisance Claims & Climate Change

73

If any of the California cases proceed under state law, state
standing requirements will apply, regardless of whether they
proceed in state or federal court (though Article III requirements
will also apply if they proceed in federal court). 133 In contrast to
the United States Constitution, however, neither the California
Constitution nor California case law imposes a “case or
controversy” requirement.134 Rather, California courts generally
may hear “a suit by a citizen in the undifferentiated public
interest.”135 California law does require a plaintiff to have a cause
of action in his own right and to pursue it in his own name, but
courts have declined to characterize these requirements of
substantive law in terms of standing. 136
IV.

SUBSTANCE OF THE PUBLIC NUISANCE
CLAIMS

Assuming that the plaintiffs can overcome the preliminary
defenses, proving the substance of the public nuisance claims will
be challenging. Nonetheless, the defendants face some
vulnerability to liability under California public nuisance law,
which will be the focus of this Part. Moreover, although AEP would
seem to cast doubt on the availability of a federal public nuisance
claim, the factual differences between the claims here and the
claims asserted in AEP suggest that federal public nuisance law
merits some attention as well.
A. California Public Nuisance Law
California law defines a nuisance as:

133. See Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host
Corp., 418 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Where, as here, jurisdiction is predicated
on diversity of citizenship, a plaintiff must have standing under both Article III
of the Constitution and applicable state law in order to maintain a cause of
action.”).
134. Nat’l Paint & Coatings Assn. v. California, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 365 (Ct.
App. 1997).
135. Id.
136. Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 426, 432–
37 (Ct. App. 2009).

25

74

Pace Environmental Law Review

[Vol. 36

Anything which is injurious to health, . . . or is indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life
or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in
the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay,
stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or
highway[.]137

A private nuisance involves interference with use or
enjoyment of private property, whereas a public nuisance involves
interference with public rights or use of public property. 138 While
the exact contours of public nuisance doctrine vary by jurisdiction,
public nuisance generally includes the following elements: “(1) an
unreasonable and substantial interference (2) with a public right
(3) where the defendant has control of the instrumentality causing
the nuisance[,]”139 or where the defendant created or assisted in
creating the nuisance.140
At common law, public rights subject to public nuisance
included rights to unobstructed highways and waterways, as well
as rights to unpolluted air and water. 141 Many states define public
nuisance by statute and thereby incorporate a broad notion of
public rights.142 In California, a public nuisance is a nuisance that
“affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be
unequal.”143 An interference with public rights is substantial if it
causes significant harm and unreasonable if the gravity of the
harm inflicted outweighs the social utility of the activity at
issue.144 Unlike in some other jurisdictions, “liability for nuisance
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2016).
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B, 821D.
139. See Albert C. Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup: Using Public
Nuisance to Compel Chemical Testing, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 974 (2010).
140. City of Modesto Redev. Agency v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865,
872 (Ct. App. 2004).
141. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I. 2008) (describing
public right); see DOBBS, supra note 36, at 1335; Donald G. Gifford, Public
Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 815 (2003)
(describing fact patterns constituting public nuisance under common law).
142. See DOBBS, supra note 36, at 1334.
143. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480.
144. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325.
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[in California] does not hinge on whether the defendant owns,
possesses or controls the property, nor on whether he is in a
position to abate the nuisance; the critical question is whether the
defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.”145
A California municipality in which a public nuisance exists
may bring a representative action in the name of the people of
California to abate the nuisance.146 This first type of public
nuisance claim traces back to the common law use of public
nuisance by the state to enjoin an ongoing harm.147 California law
also authorizes a second type of public nuisance claim: any person,
including a public entity, who has a property interest “injuriously
affected” by a nuisance may seek injunctive relief, abatement, or
damages.148 This second, non-representative, type of claim reflects
the common law rule allowing private persons to bring a public
nuisance action if they have suffered special injury.149 If the special
injury involves interference with the use and enjoyment of land,
this public nuisance claim may overlap with a private nuisance
claim.150
Public nuisance actions were typically aimed at parties whose
conduct directly created the nuisance condition, such as a facility
emitting pollution or a person blocking a waterway with refuse.151
In recent years, public nuisance actions also have been brought
against product manufacturers to address harms associated with
use of their products by a third party. These lawsuits, which lay
145. Id. (quoting Modesto Redev. Agency, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 872).
146. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731 (West 2015).
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmts. a & b (noting early
history of nuisance as “an infringement of the rights of the Crown” and
subsequently as “a large, miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal
offenses, all of which involved some interference with the interests of the
community at large”); id. § 821C cmt. a (“The original remedies for a public
nuisance were a prosecution for a criminal offense or a suit to abate or enjoin the
nuisance brought by or on behalf of the state or an appropriate subdivision by the
proper public authority.”); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 90, at 643 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing usual remedies of “criminal prosecution and
abatement by way of in injunctive decree or order”).
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 731.
149. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (allowing private
plaintiff who has “suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other
members of the public” to recover damages for public nuisance).
150. See id. § 821C(1) cmt. e (noting potential overlap between public
nuisance and private nuisance actions); see also id. § 821B cmt. h.
151. See DOBBS, supra note 36, at 1334–35, 1338.
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the foundation for the climate change public nuisance actions, are
discussed below.
B. Lead Paint Litigation
Among the public nuisance cases brought against product
manufacturers, litigation against manufacturers of lead paint has
been particularly prominent. Two California appellate court
opinions are especially significant to the climate change cases.
County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., a 2006 pre-trial
opinion, recognized that public nuisance can apply to a defendant’s
past activity that contributes to a present nuisance.152 Atlantic
Richfield opened the door to holding product manufacturers liable
for abating a public nuisance based on their past promotion of a
hazardous product.153 A 2017 post-trial opinion in the same
litigation, People v. Conagra, clarified the elements of a public
nuisance claim in California while largely upholding a trial verdict
against the paint manufacturers.154
The California lead paint litigation began with allegations by
a group of government entities that the presence of lead in homes
and buildings throughout the state constituted a public
nuisance.155 The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants had
contributed to the nuisance by promoting the use of lead paint and
failing to warn about its hazards notwithstanding their knowledge
of lead’s dangers.156 Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs filed
both a representative public nuisance action seeking abatement
and a non-representative public nuisance action seeking
damages.157
After the trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer, the
appellate court in Atlantic Richfield reversed in part and held that
the plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed with the representative

152. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 329.
153. Id.
154. People v. Conagra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 551–52
(Ct. App. 2017).
155. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 324.
156. Id. at 324–25, 328.
157. Id. at 324, 331.
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public nuisance action for abatement. 158 The appellate court’s
analysis focused on whether the defendants created or assisted in
the creation of a nuisance.159 As the court noted, the plaintiffs did
not merely allege that the defendants had produced a defective
product or failed to warn of a defective product.160 While such
allegations might support a product liability action, they would not
suffice to establish a nuisance. 161 The plaintiffs’ complaint went
further, however, asserting that the defendants had affirmatively
created or assisted in creating a widespread public health hazard
by “promot[ing] lead paint for interior use with knowledge of the
hazard that such use would create.”162 These allegations were
central to the court’s rejection of the defendants’ argument that the
plaintiffs were disguising a products liability claim as a nuisance
action. As the court explained, the alleged conduct was “far more
egregious than simply producing a defective product or failing to
warn of a defective product”; rather, it was akin “to instructing the
purchaser to use the product in a hazardous manner”—conduct
that would result in nuisance liability.163
The court was less receptive to the non-representative public
nuisance claim, which sought damages for special injury rather
than abatement.164 This cause of action, the court explained, “is
much more like a products liability cause of action because it is, at
its core, an action for damages for injuries caused to plaintiffs’
property by a product, while the core of the representative cause of
action is an action for remediation of a public health hazard.” 165
Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the dismissal of the nonrepresentative public nuisance claim.166

158. Id. at 330. In California, a demurrer may seek dismissal of a plaintiff’s
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 430.10(e).
159. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325.
160. Id. at 328.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also id. (“A public nuisance cause of action is not premised on a
defect in a product or a failure to warn but on affirmative conduct that assisted
in the creation of a hazardous condition.”).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 331.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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The subsequent bench trial on the representative public
nuisance action resulted in an order that the defendants establish
a $1.15 billion abatement fund. 167 The trial court found that the
defendants promoted lead paint with constructive, if not actual,
knowledge that using lead paint would create a hazard. 168
Applying the substantial factor approach to causation, the court
held three of the corporate defendants jointly and severally liable
for the public nuisance.169
On appeal, the court held in People v. Conagra that substantial
evidence did not support causation as to residences built after
1950.170 The court of appeals noted that the defendants stopped
promoting lead paint for interior residential use after that date and
ordered the trial court to recalculate the amount of the abatement
fund accordingly.171 However, the bulk of the trial court’s judgment
was upheld, including its finding that the defendants had actual
knowledge of the hazard during the time they promoted lead
paint.172
The plaintiffs also prevailed on several issues relevant to
climate change public nuisance litigation. First, the appellate court
rejected defendants’ argument that lead paint in private
residences did not interfere with a public right:
Residential housing, like water, electricity, natural gas, and
sewer services, is an essential community resource. Indeed,
without residential housing, it would be nearly impossible for the
“public” to obtain access to water, electricity, gas, and sewer

167. People v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 100CV788657, 2014 WL 1385823,
at *61 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014).
168. Id. at *8–10, *25.
169. Id. at *46, *61.
170. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 546–47.
171. Id. at 546, 598.
172. Id. at 529–34. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected defendants’ petition for
writ of certiorari to review the decision. Conagra Grocery Prods. Co. v. Cal., 139
S. Ct. 377 (2018); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Cal., 139 S. Ct. 378 (2018). The lead
paint manufacturers also proposed but later withdrew a ballot measure to
approve a $2 billion bond to pay for lead paint abatement, for which the
manufacturers would otherwise be responsible, and to declare lead paint not to
be a public nuisance. See Liam Dillon, Paint Companies Pull Lead Cleanup
Measure from California’s November Ballot, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2018),
https://perma.cc/5ER9-7X39; California Lead Paint Liability Initiative Heads to
Ballot, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/N3G5-EEHH.
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services. Pervasive lead exposure in residential housing
threatens the public right to essential community resources.173

Second, the court rejected the assertion that the abatement
order constituted “nothing more than a thinly-disguised damage
award . . . for unattributed past harm[.]” 174 In the court’s view, the
abatement order did not award any costs that the plaintiffs had
already expended on lead remediation; rather, the order
established an abatement fund to be used solely for funding
prospective remediation efforts.175 Characterizing the difference
“between an abatement order and a damages award [a]s stark,” the
court observed that an abatement order is an equitable remedy
whose “sole purpose is to eliminate the hazard that is causing
prospective harm to the plaintiff,” whereas damages “are directed
at compensating the plaintiff for prior accrued harm[.]”176 Finally,
the court distinguished public nuisance decisions from other
jurisdictions in which lead paint manufacturers had prevailed,
noting that “a defendant’s control of the nuisance is not necessary
to establish liablity in a representative public nuisance action in
California.”177
Indeed, the California opinions represent a marked departure
from rulings in other jurisdictions, where similar efforts to invoke
public nuisance have been rejected. Most notably, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court stepped in to overturn a verdict—the first of its
kind in the United States—that had imposed liability on lead paint
manufacturers under a public nuisance theory.178 Because
“defendants were not in control of any lead pigment at the time the
lead caused harm,” the court held, they were “unable to abate the
alleged nuisance,” and state “public nuisance law simply does not
provide a remedy for this harm.”179 The requirement that
defendants have control over the instrumentality creating the
nuisance when the harm occurs—an element absent from

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 552.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 594.
Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 434, 480.
Id. at 435.
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California law—was pivotal to the decision.180 The New Jersey
Supreme Court reached a similar result in rejecting various
municipalities’ public nuisance claims for damages against paint
manufacturers.181 Explaining that the plaintiffs’ claims “sound in
products liability causes of action” rather than public nuisance, the
New Jersey court took note of a state statute that declared lead
paint to be a nuisance and focused on the conduct of the premises
owner.182 In the climate change public nuisance cases, the
defendants will likely raise concerns similar to the Rhode Island
high court’s worry “over the ease with which a plaintiff could bring
what properly would be characterized as a products liability suit
under the guise of product-based public nuisance.”183
C. PCB Litigation
Efforts to apply the California lead paint decisions to other
instances of environmental pollution are now working their way
through the courts. Most notably, a number of West Coast cities
have asserted public nuisance claims to address polychlorinated
biphenyl (“PCB”) contamination.184 The underlying theory in each
of these cases is that Monsanto, which manufactured and sold
products containing PCBs, should be liable for cleaning up PCBs
that wound up in the environment as a result of, or after, the use
of those products.185 While these cases have yet to be fully litigated,
the rulings to date hold some promise for plaintiffs bringing
climate change public nuisance claims.
In City of San Jose v. Monsanto Co., three San Francisco Bay
Area cities allege that ongoing contamination of San Francisco Bay

180. Id. at 449–50. The court’s ruling also rested on its determination that
the asserted “right to be free from the hazards of unabated lead” did not qualify
as “a public right as that term traditionally has been understood in the law of
public nuisance.” Id. at 453.
181. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 499–502 (N.J. 2007).
182. Id. at 492–503. In addition, the New Jersey litigation was an action for
damages rather than abatement. Id. at 502.
183. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 456; see also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924
A.2d at 505.
184. See Peter Hayes, Public Nuisance PCB Suits Against Monsanto Could
Have Far-Reaching Impact, 31 TOXICS L. RPTR. 285 (2016).
185. See id.
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has forced them to spend money to reduce PCB discharge.186 The
plaintiffs rely on a non-representative public nuisance claim,
which requires them to demonstrate “a property interest
injuriously affected by the nuisance.”187 The district court initially
rejected the cities’ contention that stormwater polluted by the
defendants’ PCBs constituted such an interest. 188 However, the
California legislature subsequently enacted a law granting local
entities a right to use captured stormwater, prompting the court to
reverse its initial ruling.189 Further, the court found sufficient
allegations of a causal connection between Monsanto’s actions and
the asserted nuisance, based on the cities’ assertion that
“Monsanto knew that PCBs were dangerous, concealed that
knowledge, promoted the use of PCBs in a range of applications,
and gave disposal instructions that were likely to cause
environmental contamination.”190
PCB contamination of San Diego Bay has led to public
nuisance litigation raising representative and non-representative
claims. In contrast to Atlantic Richfield, where the court dismissed
the non-representative public nuisance claim because of its overlap
with products liability law, 191 both types of claims have survived
motions to dismiss.192 The district court in San Diego v. Monsanto
specifically found that the non-representative public nuisance
186. City of San Jose v. Monsanto Co., 231 F. Supp. 3d 357, 360–61 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
187. Id. at 361.
188. Id. at 360–61 (noting earlier ruling that stormwater is public water
belonging to the state).
189. Id. at 362.
190. Id. at 363–64. The litigation has since been stayed pending
administrative proceedings in which the cities seek reimbursement from the state
of California for the costs of retrofitting their stormwater systems to filter out
PCBs. Order Further Staying Case; Continuing Status Conference, City of San
Jose v. Monsanto Co., No. 5:15–cv–03178–EJD, No. 5:15-cv-05152-EJD, No. 5:16cv-00071-EJD (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2018) (further staying case and continuing
status conference until February 2019); City of San Jose v. Monsanto Co, 2017
WL 3335735, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
191. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313.
192. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Monsanto Co., No.15-cv-578-WQH-JLB,
2016 WL 5464551, at *4–8 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that the port district has the
authority to bring a representative public nuisance action for abatement); City of
San Diego v. Monsanto Co., No. 15-cv-578-WQH-AGS, 2017 WL 5632052, at *6
(S.D. Cal. 2017) (allowing the city’s non-representative public nuisance action to
proceed after concluding that the city had sufficiently alleged a property interest
in its municipal stormwater system).
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claim does not involve “a disguised products liability claim,” but
rather aims at the “remediation of a public health hazard” and
redress for harm to the city’s stormwater system. 193
Similar cases have also been brought against Monsanto
outside California. The city and port of Portland, Oregon have
alleged special injury from expending funds to investigate,
monitor, analyze, and remediate PCB contamination.194 The State
of Oregon has filed suit seeking abatement and damages for PCB
contamination on lands and in waters owned, controlled, or held in
trust by the state.195 Additionally, in Washington State, public
nuisance claims by the cities of Seattle and Spokane have thus far
survived motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court in City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co. held that the city, as an
owner of property abutting contaminated waterways and as the
operator of wastewater and stormwater systems facilitating the
migration of PCBs into the waterways, had alleged the necessary
injury to bring a public nuisance claim.196 The court also found
sufficient allegations of causation-in-fact and legal causation: the
city had not only alleged that “Monsanto’s PCBs are the same
PCBs that Seattle is paying to clean up,” but also that
environmental harm from the routine use of PCBs was
foreseeable.197 The district court in City of Spokane v. Monsanto
Co. reached a similar conclusion.198
Proving causation in the PCB cases may be easier than in the
climate change cases. Monsanto was the sole manufacturer of
193. City of San Diego, 2017 WL 5632052, at *7–8 (quoting Atlantic Richfield
Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313).
194. Port of Portland v. Monsanto Co., No. 3:17-cv-00015-PK, 2017 WL
4236561, at *8 (D. Or. 2017).
195. Complaint at 50, Oregon v. Monsanto Co., No. 3:18-cv-00238 (D. Or.
Jan. 4, 2018); Jes Burns, Oregon Sues Monsanto For PCB Clean-Up Costs, OR.
PUB. BROADCASTING (Jan. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/UYJ9-H6JL.
196. City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1106 (W.D. Wash.
2017). Washington law defines a public nuisance as “one which affects equally the
rights of an entire community or neighborhood, although the extent of the damage
may be unequal.” WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.130 (West 2017). Washington law
authorizes a nuisance action “by any person whose property is . . . injuriously
affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance” and a private
action for public nuisance if it is “specially injurious” to the plaintiff. Id. at
§§ 7.48.020, 7.48.210.
197. City of Seattle, 237 F. Supp. 3d at 1106–07.
198. City of Spokane v. Monsanto Co., No. 2:15-CV-00201-SMJ, 2016 WL
6275164, at *7–9 (E.D. Wash. 2016).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2

34

2018]

Public Nuisance Claims & Climate Change

83

PCBs in the United States, whereas multiple sources manufacture
products whose use results in GHG emissions. Nonetheless, this
distinction may be of little significance in California and other
jurisdictions that impose tort liability under a substantial factor
approach.
D. Public Nuisance Suits Beyond Environmental
Contamination
Other product manufacturers that have been targeted in
public nuisance actions include tobacco companies, gun
manufacturers, and opioid manufacturers and distributors.199
These cases have asserted harms to public health and safety and
sought to recover costs expended by state and local governments in
addressing those harms. The tobacco litigation, which revealed
that the tobacco industry had manipulated nicotine levels and
covered up the risks of smoking, was resolved through a
multibillion dollar settlement. 200 By contrast, public nuisance
claims against gun manufacturers were almost uniformly
unsuccessful, as courts found too attenuated the causal connection
between the manufacture of guns and the expenses incurred by
municipalities in responding to gun violence.201 The opioid public
nuisance claims, now reflected in hundreds of lawsuits, appear to
be patterned after the tobacco litigation and aimed at pressuring
the defendants into settlement.202
These efforts to expand public nuisance beyond the more
limited settings to which public nuisance traditionally applied
199. See Is the Public Nuisance Universe Expanding?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan.
31, 2017), https://perma.cc/W2WF-CTJX.
200. See DONALD G. GIFFORD, SUING THE TOBACCO AND LEAD PIGMENT
INDUSTRIES 128–32, 175–76 (2010).
201. See GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 133–36; see also Peter H. Schuck, Why
Regulating Guns Through Litigation Won’t Work, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A
BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 225, 225–26
(Timothy D. Lytton ed., 2005). Such suits were eventually barred with the passage
of the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act in 2005. See Protection of
Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, §§ 2–4, 119 Stat. 2095
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2006)).
202. See Jeanne Whalen & Sara Randazzo, Ohio Takes Steps Toward
Resolution of Opioid Litigation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://perma.cc/9C6L-JEH3; Victor E. Schwartz et al., Deep Pocket
Jurisprudence: Where Tort Law Should Draw the Line, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 359, 382–
87 (2018).
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have prompted criticisms of such efforts as “unprincipled,”203
“foreign to [public nuisance]’s historical context,” 204 and “out of
step with widely shared precepts about the proper assignment of
roles among different legal institutions in our society.” 205 Similar
critiques are likely to be aimed at the climate change cases as well.
E. Applying California Public Nuisance to Climate
Change Litigation
What do the various public nuisance cases portend for efforts
to apply state public nuisance law to climate change? Courts in
some states have been reluctant to hold product manufacturers
liable under public nuisance for harms resulting from product use
or misuse. However, as explained below, climate change
defendants face risks of liability in California and perhaps other
states that have incorporated broad conceptions of public nuisance.
California law, as reflected in the lead paint decisions,
interprets public nuisance to cover circumstances and conduct that
fall outside the scope of public nuisance in some other states. In
particular, Conagra emphasized that “[c]ontrol is not required in
California for a public nuisance action, and California’s laws
[unlike New Jersey law] do not assign exclusive responsibility for
lead paint remediation to property owners.”206 Conagra similarly
distinguished the Rhode Island lead paint decision as “based on
lack of control (which does not apply in California) and lack of
interference with a public right . . . [which] is not consistent with
California’s broader statutory definition of a public nuisance.” 207
This Section discusses the application of public nuisance law
to the California climate change lawsuits. The issues highlighted
in Conagra—lack of control and definition of a public right—could
prove determinative.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Schwartz et al., supra note 202, at 388.
GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 837.
Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 5 (2011).
Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 594 (internal citation omitted).
Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol36/iss1/2

36

2018]

Public Nuisance Claims & Climate Change

85

1. Control
Courts that require control as a condition of liability have
emphasized the importance of control at the time the damage
occurs “because the principal remedy for the harm caused by
[public] nuisance is abatement.” 208 If the climate change cases are
litigated on the merits, defendants likely will contend they cease
to exert control over their products once the products are sold and
thus should not be liable for abatement. Any interference with a
public right, they may argue, arises from the burning of fossil fuels
after control has already passed to consumers.
However, California law does not require control of the
instrumentality as an element of public nuisance. The Atlantic
Richfield and Conagra decisions suggest that courts will deem the
plaintiffs’ request for climate adaptation funding as an appropriate
form of abatement.209 Furthermore, even in jurisdictions where
control of the instrumentality is required, the Rhode Island and
New Jersey lead paint decisions may be distinguishable in that the
climate change cases involve a level of ongoing conduct and control
that the lead paint cases do not. The San Francisco complaint, for
example, alleges that the defendants continue to promote fossil
fuels and doubts about global warming today despite
overwhelming evidence of the dangers.210
2. Causation
While California law does not require control as an element of
public nuisance, it does require causation—i.e., that “the
defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.”211
In public nuisance litigation against product manufacturers,
establishing causation is a more manageable task than
208. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 449. See also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924
A.2d at 499 (“[A] public entity which proceeds against the one in control of the
nuisance may only seek to abate, at the expense of the one in control of the
nuisance”).
209. Cf. Kysar, supra note 30, at 27 (suggesting that in public nuisance
actions “governmental plaintiffs may seek to style their prayer for relief as
equitable in nature, even though it simply amounts to a request for monetary
funds to reimburse public entities for climate change adaptation”).
210. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 3, 41–48.
211. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325 (quoting Modesto Redev.
Agency, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 872).
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demonstrating control. Causation requires proof of both causationin-fact as well as proximate cause. 212
Causation-in-fact is satisfied if the defendants’ conduct was a
substantial factor in causing the nuisance.213 Here, the climate
change plaintiffs will have to show: (1) that the defendants
promoted the use of fossil fuels with knowledge of the hazard such
use would create, and (2) that these promotional efforts played
more than a negligible role in contributing to global warminginduced sea level rise. 214 The plaintiffs’ assertions—that
defendants have known of the catastrophic risks posed by their
fossil fuel products for decades and nonetheless promoted their
widespread use through advertisements, campaigns to deny
climate change, and efforts to emphasize the uncertainties of
climate science215—appear sufficient to allege a causal connection.
Whether courts would find the alleged conduct a substantial factor
in causing the nuisance is less certain: while the defendants in the
San Francisco complaint are alleged to be five of the nine “largest
cumulative producers of fossil fuels worldwide from the mid
nineteenth century to present[,]”216 they collectively appear
responsible for approximately 7.4 percent of cumulative global
GHG emissions, according to one methodology of tracing emissions
to certain actors.217
The second aspect of causation, proximate cause, presents
uncertainties as well. Proximate cause is concerned “with the
various considerations of policy that limit an actor’s responsibility
for the consequences of his conduct.” 218 A cause-in-fact may fall
212. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545.
213. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997).
214. Cf. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325–28 (discussing public
nuisance elements in context of lead paint litigation).
215. SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 41–49.
216. Id. at 33.
217. See Tess Riley, Just 100 Companies Responsible for 71% of Global
Emissions, Study Says, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/RG9J-TMHE
(listing respective cumulative GHG emissions of top 100 producers from 19882015 as percentage of global GHG emissions); cf. Kysar, supra note 30, at 39
(“[T]he climate change context poses distinct conceptual problems in terms of
attribution, given the participation of so many actors in bringing about
emissions. . ..”).
218. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545 (quoting Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Bernstein, 69 P.3d 965, 969 (Cal. 2003)). See also Eric Biber, Law in
the Anthropocene Epoch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1, 42–43 (2017) (explaining that proximate
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short of proximate causation “where there is an independent
intervening act that is not reasonably foreseeable” or the
defendant’s conduct is so remote that “it would be considered
unjust to hold him or her legally responsible.” 219 Here, the fossil
fuel company defendants are likely to argue that the ultimate
consumers of fossil fuels are directly responsible for GHG
emissions and should be considered an intervening cause.220
Similar contentions were rejected in the lead paint litigation,
however, and could be rejected here as well. 221 Consumers’ burning
of fossil fuels was intended by the defendants, and the resulting
GHG emissions were completely foreseeable. This stands in
contrast to the public nuisance litigation brought against gun
manufacturers, where the criminal use of handguns qualified as
an intervening cause largely because it was not intended by the
manufacturers.222
3. Public Right
The somewhat indeterminate concept of public right is also
likely to be litigated. In Conagra, the court rejected the defendants’
argument that no public right was at stake because interior
residential lead paint “causes only private harms in private
residences.”223 The court articulated a “‘public right’ to housing
that does not poison children” and found even private residential
housing to be “an essential community resource[,]” “like water,
electricity, natural gas, and sewer services.”224 This interpretation
of public right is broader than common law understandings of the
concept, which focused on the use of public places or the activities
cause reflects considerations such as whether a defendant’s actions are important
enough to warrant litigation, whether the impacts of an action are too complicated
to sort out, and whether recognition of extended chains of liability might paralyze
potential actors).
219. 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW TORTS § 1335 (11th ed.
2017).
220. Cf. Biber, supra note 219, at 43 (noting potential argument that “climate
change is ultimately the product of emissions from the activities of billions of
people over decades and even centuries.”).
221. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545–46.
222. See GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 822 (noting that injury from handguns
results from a third-party’s criminal use of handguns rather than from proper use
of the product).
223. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 552.
224. Id.
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of an entire community.225 It is also broader than the view
expressed in a comment to the Second Restatement of Torts:
Conduct does not become a public nuisance merely because it
interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by a large number
of persons. There must be some interference with a public right.
A public right is one common to all members of the general
public. It is collective in nature and not like the individual right
that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or
negligently injured. 226

In finding the presence of lead in private housing to infringe
upon a public right, the Conagra court arguably glossed over the
Restatement’s distinction between a violation of a public right and
multiple violations of private rights.
The public right element of public nuisance is nonetheless
likely to be satisfied in the climate change litigation, whether
under the Conagra approach or the narrower common law
understanding. Public nuisance has long encompassed
interference with public highways, navigable waterways, and
clean air.227 Climate change interferes with the use and enjoyment
of not only the waterways and the air, but also a host of public
places, including sewer and stormwater infrastructure, port
infrastructure, public roads, and public beaches. 228 It is a classic
“public bad” involving “undesirable effects that are nonexcludable
and nonrivalrous.”229
4. Tortious Conduct
Historically, public nuisance has been understood as “a type of
harm resulting from a defendant’s conduct,” as opposed to a type
of tortious conduct.230 Nevertheless, courts sometimes require
225. See GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 815.
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g.
227. See GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 815; Lin, supra note 139, at 980–81
(discussing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907), a U.S. Supreme
Court decision applying public nuisance law to air pollution).
228. SF Am. Compl. supra note 4, at 53–57; Kysar, supra note 30, at 13
(describing public nuisance “as the logical cause of action to pursue” in climate
change litigation “since it imports a duty to avoid injurious conduct to rights that
are held by the public in common”).
229. Merrill, supra note 205, at 8.
230. GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 155; see Merrill, supra note 205, at 16.
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proof of some sort of tortious conduct. As the Restatement (Second)
of Torts puts it: a defendant’s “interference with the public right
[must be] intentional or . . . unintentional and otherwise
actionable under the principles controlling liability for negligent or
reckless conduct or for abnormally dangerous activities.”231
With respect to product manufacturers, the tortious conduct
at issue in a public nuisance case is the promotion of a product
“with knowledge of the hazard that such use would create.”232
Actual knowledge is required and may be proven through
circumstantial evidence as to what a defendant must have been
aware of.233 The climate change public nuisance complaints allege
that the defendants knew that fossil fuels were contributing to
global warming and nonetheless sought to promote their use.234
Specific allegations cite a 1968 report informing the defendants
that carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels were “almost
certain’ to produce ‘significant’ temperature increases,” as well as
internal company documents from the 1980s warning of
“catastrophic” climate effects.235 If proven, these allegations
appear sufficient to demonstrate the required knowledge.
To prove that a defendant’s interference with a public right is
tortious, plaintiffs must also establish unreasonableness—a
requirement that weighs the gravity of the harm against the utility
of the conduct.236 The factors that courts consider in assessing
unreasonableness include: whether the conduct significantly
interferes with public health or safety; “whether the conduct is
proscribed by statute . . . or regulation;” and “whether the conduct
is of a continuing nature or has . . . [a] long-lasting effect[.]”237
Notably, the specific conduct that should be analyzed for
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 328.
Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 529–30.
SF Am. Compl., supra note 4, at 41–49.
Id. at 35–36.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e (referring to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 826–31); Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 325 (noting that “interference must be both substantial and
unreasonable” and explaining that interference “is substantial if it causes
significant harm and unreasonable if its social utility is outweighed by the gravity
of the harm inflicted”).
237. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821B(2)(a)–(c); see also Lead
Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 447 (noting that analysis of reasonability “will depend
upon the activity in question and the magnitude of the interference it creates”).
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unreasonableness is defendants’ promotion of fossil fuels with
knowledge of its hazards, not the useful product itself.238 The social
utility of this specific conduct appears minuscule in comparison to
the long-lasting and devastating harms of climate change.
If courts reach the substantive merits of the climate change
public nuisance claims, the fossil fuel defendants face risks of
liability. Although the defendants will hotly contest issues of
causation, public rights, and benefit-harm balancing, California
public nuisance law appears sufficiently broad to encompass
defendants’ conduct and resulting harms.
F. Federal Public Nuisance
The district court’s decision to keep the San Francisco Bay
lawsuits in federal court rested on its determination that the
plaintiffs’ claims “are necessarily governed by federal common
law.”239 The court acknowledged that the Clean Air Act displaced
federal common law claims against domestic emitters of GHGs, per
AEP and Kivalina, but reasoned that the San Francisco Bay
lawsuits were arguably distinguishable because they aimed at “an
earlier moment in the train of industry”—the production and sale
of fossil fuels.240 Nonetheless, in later dismissing the case, the
court found this distinction legally irrelevant, stating “[i]f an oil
producer cannot be sued under the federal common law for their
own emissions, a fortiori they cannot be sued for someone else’s.”241
The court also declined to recognize a federal public nuisance claim
for non-U.S. emissions—which are outside the scope of the Clean
Air Act—on the ground that their regulation is best left to the
political branches of government.242
Even if a court were to reach the substantive merits of a
federal public nuisance claim, proof of public nuisance may be more
difficult under federal law than under California law. A line of
Supreme Court decisions recognizes states’ ability to bring federal
public nuisance actions to abate air and water pollution produced

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Cf. Conagra, 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 596.
California, 2018 WL 1064293, at *2.
Id. at *4.
Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1024.
Id. at 1024–28.
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by other states or out-of-state industries.243 These decisions have
left the precise contours of federal public nuisance law relatively
undefined, however, and courts have looked to state standards and
the Second Restatement of Torts to fill in the details. 244 Lower
courts have generally adopted the Restatement definition of public
nuisance as a substantial and unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public.245 While the Restatement does
not explicitly condition liability on a defendant’s control of the
instrumentality causing the nuisance, federal courts may well
adopt the majority view among the states that such control is
required.246 As discussed above, the defendants in the climate
change cases will likely contend that control of the instrumentality
rests in the hands of their customers rather than themselves.247
Furthermore, in determining whether defendants’ conduct was
unreasonable, federal courts may be inclined to balance the social
utility of fossil fuel use against the harms of climate change—a
balancing approach less favorable than one focused more narrowly
on defendants’ promotion of fossil fuels with knowledge of its
hazards.248
V.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Developing climate change policy through individual
abatement actions is less than ideal. Tort law typically addresses
harms to identifiable persons resulting from actions by identifiable

243. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103–05 (1972) (Milwaukee I);
Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237–38; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 519–21
(1906); see also Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 419–20. For a detailed discussion
of the Supreme Court’s federal public nuisance jurisprudence, see Mark P. Nevitt
& Robert V. Percival, Could Official Climate Denial Revive the Common Law as
a Regulatory Backstop?, 96 WASH. U.L. REV. 441 (2018).
244. Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107; Michigan v. United States Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 904 (7th Cir. 2014); Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 309; Nat’l Sea
Clammers Ass’n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated
on other grounds, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
245. Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 351–52.
246. See Lin, supra note 139, at 974 n.97.
247. See, e.g., Motion of Defendant to Dismiss First Amended Complaints at
19, City of Oakland v. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 3:17-cv6011-WHA).
248. See Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1025 (dicta suggesting a broad
balancing of harms and benefits of fossil fuel use).
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actors, rather than broader threats to society.249 In terms of
legitimacy, policymaking ideally occurs through democratically
accountable legislative processes and authorized agency
rulemaking, not litigation.250 Furthermore, a coordinated federal
policy can bring agency expertise and resources to bear on a
complicated problem involving multiple actors and generate a
more effective response.251 Yet, in the absence of adequate
legislative and executive responses to climate change, the plaintiff
municipalities face very real harms from climate change and
significant costs in adapting to rising sea levels. Public nuisance
actions offer a potentially viable mechanism for abating the
ongoing threat and financing the adaptation necessitated by the
defendants’ past and present conduct.
Successful public nuisance actions against fossil fuel
defendants could prompt federal legislation to address climate
change. Public nuisance litigation against the tobacco industry led
to a negotiated settlement that—had it been approved by
Congress—would have largely resolved defendants’ liability in
exchange for curbing tobacco advertising and recognizing FDA
authority over tobacco products.252 Public nuisance litigation
against the gun industry also led to congressional efforts—this
time successful—that insulated the industry from liability.253 The
outcomes of these previous efforts to apply public nuisance hint at
the difficult road ahead for advocates of climate change action.
Even if they achieve favorable judgments in their actions for
abatement, a legislated solution to climate change is not
guaranteed to follow. These advocates will need to convince courts,
policymakers, and the general public that the fossil fuel defendants
should be held responsible for contributing to climate change and

249. See Biber, supra note 219, at 45.
250. See Merrill, supra note 205, at 5 (“As a public action, the proper
institution to determine the parameters of public nuisance liability is the
legislature—or some institution delegated authority to do so by the legislature—
not courts based on a claim of common law authority.”); GIFFORD, supra note 200,
at 200–01.
251. See GIFFORD, supra note 200, at 199–200.
252. See id. at 132, 173–74. The settlement agreement that was ultimately
adopted did not establish FDA regulatory authority over tobacco products, but
required no congressional approval. See id. at 175–76.
253. See id. at 136.
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that legislated policy to address climate change is warranted. 254
Ultimately, legislated outcomes might range from the creation of
an adaptation fund financed by fossil fuel companies in exchange
for protection from tort liability, or imposition of a carbon tax
whose proceeds could be redistributed to local governments and
individual citizens, to—at the other extreme—preemption of state
tort litigation.255
There are also potential outcomes short of success on the
merits and/or a legislative fix that could still advance the ball on
climate change. These cases represent a new pressure point on the
fossil fuel industry, and a new spotlight on that industry’s
engagement with climate law and policy. They make the case that
these companies are not passive players who merely responded to
consumer demand for fossil fuels but are bad actors who have lied
for years to generate ever larger profits at the expense of the local
governments and individual citizens and residents who bear the
costs of climate impacts. The drama of the courtroom setting could
mobilize the public’s interest and give life to local activism on these
issues. Moreover, the prospect of adverse judgments might nudge
fossil fuel companies to accelerate their own transition away from
past practices, towards new approaches to providing energy to
consumers.

254. Cf. id. at 136–37 (considering possible explanations for why tobacco
litigation and gun litigation yielded differing outcomes).
255. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who
Should Pay, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 26–36 (2007) (discussing four
approaches for allocating adaptation costs based on who should pay: beneficiaries
of adaptation measures, the public, GHG emitters, or beneficiaries of climate
change); Hester, supra note 35, at 74–75 (discussing state tort reform initiatives
aimed at eliminating or limiting public nuisance actions).
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